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Abstract
Comparative advertising by one brand against another showcases its merits
versus the demerits of the other. In a two-stage game with ﬁnitely many ﬁrms,
ﬁrms decide ﬁrst how much to advertise against whom. In the second stage,
given the advertising conﬁguration, ﬁrms compete as Cournot oligopolists. In
the symmetric case, equilibrium advertising constitutes a clear welfare loss.
Equilibrium advertising levels and advertising expenditures decline with rising
advertising costs. Whereas equilibrium advertising levels decrease in the num-
ber of ﬁrms, aggregate advertising expenditures increase. In the asymmetric
case, a variety of outcomes are possible in equilibrium depending on parameter
values. We further relate eﬀectiveness of advertising to proximity in product
space. With two ﬁrms, comparative advertising and quality choice have similar
eﬀects. In a three-stage game, where ﬁrms choose ﬁrst location (variety), then
advertising levels (quality), and then quantities, we observe maximum horizon-
tal product diﬀerentiation and minimum vertical product diﬀerentiation.
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11 Introduction
In the present paper, we address a fairly common phenomenon in today’s advertis-
ing world that has been largely ignored in the literature, namely advertising wars
where one brand compares itself favorably with a competing brand in various kinds
of media, especially television. The reader is reminded of the cola wars and similar
episodes of casual empiricism. We are mainly interested in the economic aspects of
advertising and advertising wars and less in the details of the craft which is the sub-
ject of marketing research. The economics literature on advertising has focussed on
two separate yet related issues: First, the competitive or anti-competitive eﬀects of
advertising. Second, the question whether advertising is too much or too little from
the perspective of social welfare.
On the issue of competitive eﬀects of advertising, Kaldor in his seminal 1950 con-
tribution suggests a “concentration-eﬀect” which, depending on the circumstances
may operate at the manufacturing, wholesale or retail level. Advertising may fa-
cilitate or simply accelerate industry concentration through the creation of brands,
diﬀerentiated products and “goodwill”. Much of the later debate centers around the
question whether and why incumbent ﬁrms have an advantage in advertising and can
use it to put barriers to entry. See Bain (1956), Schmalensee (1974), Comanor and
Wilson (1979) among others.
On purely theoretical grounds, it may be diﬃcult to separate causes and eﬀects
of advertising, if the degree and eﬀectiveness of advertising depend on market condi-
tions which in turn are modiﬁed by advertising.1 In the sequel, we shall assume an
oligopolistic industry structure. This assumption permits comparative statics of the
equilibrium levels of advertising with respect to the number of oligopolists. Thus to
some extent, the eﬀect of the market structure on the intensity of advertising can be
studied in our model. The converse question of the causes of the prevailing market
structure – and of advertising as a potential cause – is beyond the scope of our
investigation.
1According to Dorfman and Steiner (1954), there will be no advertising under perfect competition
and heavy advertising under imperfect competition. The speciﬁc conclusion of zero advertising under
perfect competition need not obtain in other models; see e.g. Stigler and Becker (1977), Stegeman
(1991).
2Regarding the question of whether ﬁrms buy the socially optimal amount of ad-
vertising, the direct costs and beneﬁts to the individual ﬁrm are evident. As a rule, it
pays for its own advertisements. Its beneﬁts derive from the fact that ceteris paribus
its advertising eﬀort aﬀects the demand for its product positively. This may occur
through a gain of market share at the expense of other ﬁrms or an increase of de-
mand for the entire industry. 2 In the ﬁrst case, in the absence of greater general
demand, it is possible that individual demand shifts – which each are proﬁtable for
the respective ﬁrm – neutralize each other. Then the aggregate eﬀect of advertising
may be zero or insigniﬁcant, whereas ﬁrms incur substantial advertising costs. Such
a Prisoner-Dilemma-like situation can arise in our model.
As for consumer welfare, the literature distinguishes between “informative adver-
tising” and “persuasive” advertising. As Kaldor (1950) noted, this distinction is a
matter of degree; whereas all advertising is persuasive in intention and informative in
character, the motive of persuasion can be very strong in some cases and relatively
weak in others. Informative advertising can be beneﬁcial to consumers to the extent
that it reduces search costs. It may inform consumers about existence of a product,
its characteristics, its price or price distribution, the location of its vendors, etc.
The implications of persuasive advertising for consumer welfare are much more
controversial. For instance, consider the partial equilibrium model of oligopoliostic
competition that we are going to analyze. Suppose one ignores the usual concerns
whether consumer surplus is an adequate measure of welfare and compares consumer
surpluses for diﬀerent levels of advertising. Are these valid welfare comparisons, if
t h es h i f to ft h ed e m a n dc u r v e si sb r o u g h ta b o u tb yas h i f ti nc o n s u m e rt a s t e s ?
For their model with explicit utility functions which have advertising as an ar-
gument, Dixit and Norman (1978) argue that diﬀerent market outcomes should be
compared on the basis of constant preferences, say pre-advertising or post-advertising
tastes. They ﬁnd excessive advertising in terms of pre-advertising and post-advertising
tastes. Fisher and McGowan (1979) argue that each outcome should be evaluated on
the basis of the tastes that brought it about. See also the reply by Dixit and Norman
(1978).
Fisher and McGowan’s argument against Dixit and Norman’s “shifting tastes”
2Advertising may also help deter entry as noted earlier.
3approach hints at the main alternative, the “stable tastes” approach pioneered by
Stigler and Becker (1977) and others, applied by Nichols (1985) and further developed
by Becker and Murphy (1993).3 Apart from some striking conclusions, the appeal of
the stable tastes approach lies in the fact that it can rely on standard methods of
economic analysis without resorting to explanations from other social sciences.
Although consumer preferences are not explicitly modelled in our partial equilib-
rium setting of oligopolistic competition, the distinction between shifting and stable
tastes remains relevant. Namely, one can follow either Dixit and Norman or Fisher
and McGowan when comparing total (consumer plus producer) surpluses. For some
symmetric versions of our model, such a choice is unnecessary. We side with Fisher
and McGowan, if we have to choose. Let us add that the prevailing taxonomy, shift-
ing versus stable tastes, is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. As a conceivable third
alternative, consider the case of two chemically and physically identical laundry de-
tergents. Some consumers are well aware of this fact and indiﬀerent between the two.
If prices are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, a consumer will choose the cheaper alternative.
Otherwise, the consumer chooses at random or, as a repeat buyer, sticks with the pre-
viously chosen brand with occasional experimentation. All that advertising does is to
raise consumer awareness of a brand so that consumers choose it or experiment with
it with higher probability. But advertising does not make the brand more valuable
to consumers. If the advertised brand happens to be unavailable in the store while
the other brand is available, consumers are not disappointed, since they still assess
the two brands as equally good. Last but not the least, there are indirect welfare
eﬀects of advertising beyond the scope of this paper and most of the literature. For
example, if for whatever reasons, advertising could boost general consumer demand,
then it might be helpful in preventing, mitigating or shortening economic recessions.
As another example, if advertising happens to have a “concentration-eﬀect”, then
one has to deal with pros and cons of industry concentration as well.
Our subject is advertising wars where explicitly or by implication one brand takes
on a particular competing brand and vice versa. Such targeted ad campaigns are
comparative in nature and suggest the superiority of one’s own brand in some di-
3Stigler and Becker assume that consumers do not care about goods per se, but their attributes
-or charecteristics in the tradition of Lancaster. Becker and Murphy postulate that advertisements
and goods advertised are complements in stable metautility functions.
4mension(s). But they may turn negative and stress the inferiority of the competing
brand. Because of its surge in recent political campaigns and its rise in commercial
campaigns, comparative advertising has received increasing attention in both popu-
lar and specialized media. However, the tactical details of comparative advertising
such as optimal framing of ads are of secondary concern to us here - despite some
potentially exciting economic, ethical, legal and marketing issues. What exactly con-
stitutes “competitive bashing” or comparative advertising is a matter of degree and
perception. For attempts to deﬁne negative advertising and assess its eﬀectiveness,
see James and Hensel (1991) and Sorescu and Gelb (2000). For our purposes, we need
not and do not specify whether the content of a ﬁrm’s ads is positive or negative,
though we implicitly assume that the ﬁrm chooses whatever format works best for it.
Thus in our reduced form model of advertising wars, a ﬁrm simply determines the
amount of advertising against each of the other ﬁrms.
We develop a simple game theoretic model wherein targeted comparative advertis-
ing will have a positive impact on the demand of the advertised brand and a negative
impact on the demand of the targeted competing brand. The player set consists of
a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms. Our static game has two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the
players decide whom to advertise against. In the second stage, given the advertising
conﬁguration determined in the ﬁrst stage, they compete as Cournot oligopolists. In
section 2, we introduce the second-stage Cournot model. In section 3, we develop the
static two-stage model of comparative advertising and provide suﬃcient conditions
for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Under these conditions,
the equilibrium advertising eﬀorts are unique and positive. Later in the section, we
revisit some of the welfare issues raised above.
In section 4, we consider the perfectly symmetric case where one can explicitly
solve for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In this particular case, equilibrium prices
and quantities are the same as in the Cournot model without advertising. Hence, each
ﬁrm would gain if they refrained from advertising. We go on to study the sustainabil-
ity of collusion with respect to advertising in the inﬁnitely repeated two-stage game.
Obviously, the ﬁrms could make further gains by colluding in advertising and output
decisions. It turns out that under certain conditions, collusion in advertising and
output can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the inﬁnitely
5repeated game whenever collusion in advertising alone can be supported. In the sym-
metric static model, we further ﬁnd, among other things, that individual advertising
levels decrease with the number of ﬁrms whereas aggregate advertising expenditures
increase in the number of ﬁrms.
In section 5, we consider deviations from symmetry in a duopoly, focusing on one
asymmetry at a time: asymmetry in intercepts, in advertising cost parameters and in
advertising eﬀectiveness parameters. For certain parameter values, the “smaller” ﬁrm,
the one with the smaller demand intercept without advertising, not only advertises
more but also produces more than the other ﬁrm. The ﬁrm with higher advertis-
ing cost parameter may advertise more than the other ﬁrm. For certain parameter
constellations, advertising can serve as an entry deterrence device. Diﬀerences in
advertising eﬀectiveness can have similar eﬀects.
In section 6, we explore possible links between the degree of product diﬀeren-
tiation and eﬀectiveness of comparative advertising. Section 7 contains concluding
comments. Section 8 contains proofs and derivations.
2 The Cournot Model
In this section, we present the Cournot model, that will constitute the second stage of
our two-stage advertising model. There are a ﬁnite number n > 2 of ﬁrms belonging
to the set N = {1,2,...,n}. Generic ﬁrms are denoted i, j or k. pi denotes ﬁrm i’s
price and qi denotes its quantity. Firms produce imperfect substitutes. So the inverse
demand function for ﬁrm i assumes the form




where αi > 0 and 0 <ε<1.
We note that the above demand function emerges from a quality augmented ver-
sion of a standard utility function introduced by Vives (1999) and further employed




















6where I stands for the expenditure of the consumer on other goods. If we maximize
this utility function subject to a budget constraint
n X
i=1
pi · qi + I ≤ R
where R is the total income of the consumer, the ﬁrst order condition determining
the optimal consumption of the product sold by ﬁrm i on the market is:
∂U
∂qi
= αi − qi − ε ·
X
k6=i
qk − pi =0
which gives rise to the inverse demand function (1).
For each ﬁrm, we assume a constant marginal cost ci and a ﬁxed cost CF
i , resulting
from the ﬁrst-stage advertising decision so that its total costs are
Ci = ci · qi + C
F
i . (2)
With proﬁts given by: πi = pi · qi − Ci, we solve the Cournot equilibrium in
subsection 8.1 where we also develop the necessary and suﬃcient conditions (21)f o r
positive equilibrium quantities. In the latter case, Cournot equilibrium quantities
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and ∂qi/∂αj = − 1
2−ε · ε
2+(n−1)ε
for i 6= j.S i n c eε<2, ∂qi/∂αi > 0 and ∂qi/∂αj < 0 for i 6= j.
For later reference, let us also report the collusive outcome. If ﬁrms collude to
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[αi − ci]qi − C
F
i . (6)
73 The Two-Stage Model of Advertising
In this section, we consider a two-stage game played by n ﬁrms where in the second
stage, the ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition described by the model of the previous
section.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, a (pure) strategy for ﬁrm i is a vector si =
(si1;.....;si,i−1;si,i+1;...;sin) where sij ∈ R+ for each j ∈ N\{i}. Throughout the
paper, we restrict our attention to pure strategies. The set of ﬁrst-period (pure)
strategies of ﬁrm i is denoted by Si.S i n c eﬁrm i has the option of advertising against
each of the other n−1 competitors, Si = R
n−1
+ .T h es e tS = S1 ×S2 ×S3 ×...×Sn
is the joint strategy space of all ﬁrms. A strategy proﬁle s =( s1,s2, ···,s n) ∈ S
deﬁnes an advertising outcome. Also denote S−i =
Q
j6=i
Sj, the set of strategy proﬁles
of all ﬁrms but i. For analytical reasons, we take sij to be the advertising levels
which cause advertising expenditures eij = s2
ij · φij, giving rise to the cost functions
(9) below. Obviously, it would be possible to cast the model in terms of advertising
expenditures instead.
To describe the eﬀects of advertising, we introduce parameters θ
i
ij > 0 and θ
j
ij > 0
for all i and j 6= i.I fﬁrm i chooses the advertising level of sij > 0 against ﬁrm j,t h e n
there is a positive gain for ﬁrm i in the sense that its demand increases by sij ·θ
i
ij.I f
conversely ﬁrm j chooses an advertising level sji against ﬁrm i, the latter’s demand
falls by sji·θ
i
ji. To be precise, advertising aﬀects the intercepts αi of the second-stage
inverse demand functions (1) as follows:











where βi > 0 is exogenously given. Notice that (1) can be viewed as a demand
relation where i’s demand depends on its own price and the quantities produced by
others.




We have stated that the second-stage ﬁxed costs in (2) are advertising expenses
determined by ﬁrst-stage decisions. Speciﬁcally, we assume numbers φij > 0 for all i








ij · φij. (9)
In the second stage, the ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, given their cost functions, the
(inverse) demand functions and the strategy proﬁle of the ﬁrst stage. The Cournot
outcome is unique and is given by (3) and (4) in case it is positive. It depends on
the ﬁrst-stage proﬁle s ∈ S via (7) and (9). Hence, for every strategy proﬁle s of the
ﬁrst stage, there will be a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the second stage. Let
qi(s) denote the equilibrium quantity chosen by ﬁrm i given the strategy proﬁle s of
the ﬁrst stage and πi(s) be the resultant equilibrium proﬁts. In the remainder of this
section, we utilize the explicit expressions for qi(s) and πi(s) to determine gains and
losses from advertising (subsection 3.1), present suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of the subgame perfect equilibrium (subsection 3.2), and assess equilibrium welfare
(subsection 3.3).
3.1 Gains and Losses from Advertising
If one disregards advertising costs, then as a rule, an advertiser gains from compar-
ative advertising and the targeted ﬁrm loses. Moreover, the proﬁts of third parties
tend to be aﬀected as well. Each eﬀect has two components. By (3), (4), (7), and








































Hence there are two sources of gain from strategic advertising, namely, the fact
that the advertising ﬁrm’s demand is increasing and the fact that the demand of
the ﬁrm advertised against is decreasing. The loss of course stems from the cost of
advertising. Hence as long as the cost of advertising is suﬃciently small, a ﬁrm always
gains by advertising.




































There are also two sources of loss for the ﬁrm being advertised against, namely a
decline of its own demand and a rise of its rival’s demand.
Finally consider the third parties, that is ﬁrms k diﬀerent from i and j.S u c ha






























Thus third parties stand to gain if the loss of the ﬁrm incurred by the ﬁrm adver-
tised against is greater than the gain of the advertising ﬁrm (where advertising costs
are ignored).
3.2 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
We have solved for the Cournot Nash equilibrium in the second stage, obtaining quan-
tities qi(s) and proﬁts πi(s) as functions of the ﬁrst-period strategy proﬁle. To obtain
the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), we can use backward induction and
solve for a Nash equilibrium s∗ ∈ S of the one-stage game based on continuation



















for i 6= j. Then the previous expression ∂πi(s)/∂sij reduces to
∂πi(s)
∂sij
=2 qi(s)Vij − 2sij · φij.
10Since Vij > 0,t h eﬁrst order condition for maximization with respect to sij becomes
sij = qi(s)Vij/φij (10)
where qi(s) is given by (3) and (7). If the resulting system of linear equations in
the n(n − 1) variables sij,i6= j has a strictly positive solution s∗,t h e n(s∗,q(.)) =
(s∗
i,q i(.))i∈N is a candidate for a SPNE of the two-stage game. For a wide range of
parameter values, such an s∗ exists and is unique and (s∗,q(.)) is a SPNE indeed.
Proposition 1 Suppose (22) holds for all i ∈ N.T h e n f o r s u ﬃciently large φij,
i 6= j, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium (s∗,q(.)) of the two-stage game.
Moreover, s∗ is unique and satisﬁes 0 <s ∗
ij < 1 for all i 6= j.
The proof and conditions (22) can be found in subsection 8.2. In essence, the
proposition says that if the cost of advertising is suﬃciently large, then there will be
a positive but limited amount of advertising.
3.3 Equilibrium Welfare
Under certain conditions, like in the special case considered in the next section, the
equilibrium advertising eﬀorts of ﬁrm i against ﬁrm j and vice versa will oﬀset each
other. Hence, the advertising expenses constitute a net loss from a social welfare per-
spective. Neither producers nor consumers are ultimately aﬀected by the possibility
of comparative advertising, except for advertising costs. Still, each individual ﬁrm has
an incentive to advertise up to a certain point. Such a scenario is reminiscent of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma and has been described verbally already by Pigou (1924, p. 176):
“It may happen that the expenditures on advertising made by competing monopolists
simply neutralize one another, and leave the industrial position exactly as it would
have been if neither had expended anything. For clearly, if each of two rivals makes
equal eﬀorts to attract the favour of the public away from the other, the total result
is the same if neither had made any eﬀo r ta ta l l . ”C o n s u m e r sm a yh a v eg a i n e d ,o f
course, if the advertising eﬀorts have created the perception of higher product qual-
ity. With comparative advertising, however, the utility eﬀects may also neutralize
each other and Pigou’s verdict of wasteful advertising may be well be justiﬁed even
if consumer welfare is taken into account.
11In general, straightforward welfare conclusions may prove impossible. First, our
existence result relies on the quadratic form of the cost terms s2
ij · φij in (9). This







which becomes negative for suﬃciently large φij. On the other hand, linear cost terms







Consequently best responses and SPNE would fail to exist. Secondly, advertising
eﬀorts need not be oﬀsetting across ﬁrms and, therefore equilibrium quantities and
prices may be aﬀected by advertising as we show in Section 5. In that case, the welfare
of ﬁrms can still be evaluated. But as explained in the introduction, the assessment of
consumer welfare tends to be more problematic if consumers respond to comparative
advertising. To the extent that comparative advertising is uninformative and merely
persuasive, in other words is an attempt to manipulate consumer preferences, the
question arises how to account for the part of the change in consumer surplus that
is attributable to a shift of the consumers’ willingness to pay. Thirdly, as a rule, the
SPNE is only implicitly given which makes it diﬃcult to draw ﬁrm conclusions. For
these reasons, we specialize in the next section.
Before we turn to this special case, let us report (without the straightforward
b u tl e n g t h ya n a l y t i c a ld e t a i l s )s o m eg e n e r a lf a c t s .I nt h es p i r i to fS t i g l e ra n dB e c k e r
(1977), Fisher and McGowan (1979), and Becker and Murphy (1993), let us take
preferences as stable.4 In concrete terms, let us measure welfare by means of total
surplus that is the sum of producer surplus (industry proﬁts) and consumer surplus.
Obviously one source of ineﬃciency is the very fact that the ﬁrms behave as Cournot
oligopolists and hence do not choose quantities at levels where price equals marginal
cost. But that is a well-known fact and we are primarily interested in ineﬃciencies
related to strategic advertising. So let us suppose that ﬁr m sc o n t i n u et ob e h a v ea s
Cournot oligopolists but the social planner can now select levels of strategic advertis-
ing in a bid to maximize welfare. Then as a rule, the ﬁrst order conditions for welfare
4For lack of an explicit description of preferences, this is an implicit assumption, though.
12maximizing advertising levels diﬀer from the system (10). In the special perfectly
symmetric case of the next section, the welfare maximizing advertising levels turn
out to be zero so that Pigou’s verdict holds even if consumer welfare is taken into
account. However, the welfare maximizing advertising levels are not always zero. The
latter occurs for an almost symmetric model with diﬀerential impact of advertising
as follows. There are constants α>0, c>0,θ>0 and φ>0 such that for all i and








ji = θ, φij = φ. Provided that the exis-
tence and uniqueness result of Proposition 1 holds, we ﬁnd that for suﬃciently large φ,
the welfare maximizing advertising levels are positive but less than the SPNE levels.
We conjecture that for large, but not too large φ, the welfare maximizing advertising
levels may exceed the SPNE levels.
4 The Symmetric Case
In the perfectly symmetric case, one can explicitly solve for the SPNE. This permits
detailed welfare analysis and a study of the eﬀects and sustainability of collusion.
The perfectly symmetric case is given by constants α>0,c>0,θ >0, and φ>0









Because of the last identities, advertising has an oﬀ-setting impact, if ﬁrms choose
equal advertising levels.
4.1 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
As a immediate consequence of Proposition 1, we obtain
Corollary 1 Suppose α>c . Then for suﬃciently large φ, there exists a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium (s∗,q(.)) of the two stage game with the property that
0 <s ∗
ij < 1 for all i 6= j.
Under the symmetry assumptions, the SPNE can be easily found. Namely, we


















2+( n − 1)ε
(12)
for all i,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,a n dt h eﬁrst order conditions (10) are satisﬁed. Therefore:
Corollary 2 Suppose α>c . Then for suﬃciently large φ, the SPNE advertising
levels are given by (11) and the equilibrium quantities are given by (12).
This SPNE possesses several interesting properties. First and foremost, as ex-
pected the equilibrium quantities are unaﬀected by the beneﬁt and cost parame-
ter θ and φ and the corresponding equilibrium levels of advertising. The pairwise
levels of advertising in (11) are linear in the beneﬁt-cost ratio θ/φ. They are de-
creasing in n indicating that the smaller the number of ﬁrms, the more intensive









. Therefore, a rise in the cost parameter φ leads to a reduction
of advertising levels and a decline in individual advertising expenditures. Individual
advertising expenditures increase in the number of ﬁrms if n is less than 1+2 /ε
and decrease otherwise. While levels of advertising decline in the number of ﬁrms
and individual advertising expenditures may decrease, total advertising expenditure
E = n(n − 1)e always increases with the number of ﬁrms.
4.2 Beneﬁcial Collusion
Firms have an incentive to collude with respect to advertising or output decisions, or
both. Let us focus on advertising ﬁrst. The equilibrium advertising levels (11) amount
to a total advertising expenditure E = n(n−1)e. Since the equilibrium quantities (12)
are unaﬀected by advertising, consumer welfare is unaﬀected by advertising. Hence
the advertising expenditure E incurred by ﬁrms is a clear welfare loss. This would
be a justiﬁcation for a ban on comparative advertising. Germany, for instance, has
traditionally banned comparative advertising, because it was considered a form of
“improper competition”. Another way to avoid the welfare loss would be collusion
among ﬁrms - which might be tolerated by regulators as long as consumer protection
is not an issue. Compared to the SPNE outcome each ﬁrm can gain
g =( n − 1)e
14if they refrain from advertising, assuming that the second-stage Cournot competition
persists. But given that no body else advertises, the ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate
from the collusive outcome. If it does not advertise, its payoﬀ is given by (4) and (12)
with CF
i =0 . Let h be the additional payoﬀ the ﬁrm receives, if it chooses optimal
levels of advertising. Since, ∂πi(s)/∂sij =2 qi(s)Vij at s =( 0 ,...,0) which is again
equal to 2qi(s∗)Vij > 0 where qi(s∗) is given by (12), h>0 holds. If φ is suﬃciently
high, one can calculate h precisely namely,
h =
(α − c)2 · θ
2(n − 1)
(2 + (n − 1)ε)2((2 − ε)2φ − (n − 1)θ
2)
and in fact, h>gis possible.
4.3 Sustainable Collusion
While there exist incentives to deviate from the collusive outcome in the two-stage
game, collusion may be sustainable if the two-stage game is inﬁnitely repeated. Sup-
pose there are periods t =0 ,1,2,.... In each period the two-stage game is played.
Suppose ﬁrm i’s time preferences are given by a discount factor δi ∈ (0,1). We can
assume that in each period, ﬁrms choose advertising levels in the ﬁrst stage and play a
Cournot equilibrium in the second stage, given these advertising levels. By a standard
argument there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in trigger strategies for the





1+h/g for all i. This means that the collusive outcome is sustainable for
suﬃciently large discount factors.
The ﬁrms have an incentive to collude with respect to advertising and output
levels, since without advertising, the collusive payoﬀs given by (5) and (6) exceed




(α − c)2(n − 1)2ε2
4(1 + (n − 1)ε)(2 + (n − 1)ε)
.
Then, G = g + g0 is a ﬁrm’s payoﬀ gain from two-fold collusion relative to its SPNE
payoﬀ in the two-stage game. Clearly, there exist stronger incentives for two-fold
collusion than collusion in advertising only. But, one might suspect that the incentives
for deviation are also stronger. It turns out that in the inﬁnitely repeated two-stage
15game, the incentives to deviate from two-fold collusion can be less than the incentives
to deviate from collusion in advertising only.
Let h0 denote the additional payoﬀ the ﬁrm receives, if it deviates optimally from
collusion in the Cournot model without advertising. The key observation is that
in each period, the two-stage game is played. Therefore, if in any period, a player
deviates in the ﬁrst stage, the other players have the opportunity for instantaneous
retaliation in the second stage of the same period. To be concise, let us state
Proposition 2 Suppose h0 6 h. If for some discount factor δi,i∈ N, collusion in
advertising can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium in trigger strategies,
then there exist discount factors δ
0
i <δ i,i∈ N, such that collusion in advertising and
output can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium in trigger strategies.
The essence of the argument is as follows. Suppose that a ﬁrm considers a ﬁrst
d e v i a t i o ni nt h eﬁrst stage of some period. Then the trigger strategies can be such that
play reverts from collusion in output to Cournot equilibrium play in the second stage
of that period and from collusion in advertising and output to the SPNE of the two-
stage game in all subsequent periods. Hence, the one-time undiscounted gain from
such deviation is equal to h−g0 which is less than h, the one-time undiscounted gain
from such a deviation when only collusion in advertising was implemented, whereas
t h es u b s e q u e n tf o r g o n eb e n e ﬁts from collusion is equal to G in each period which is
more than g.
Suppose next that in some period, a ﬁrm considers a ﬁrst deviation in the second
s t a g eo ft h a tp e r i o d .T h e nh0, the one-time undiscounted gain from such a deviation
is at most h. But the potential deviator forgoes the (undiscounted) collusive beneﬁts
G in every subsequent period when play reverts from collusion in advertising and
output to the SPNE of the two-stage game. Since G is higher than g, the forfeited
beneﬁts from collusion in advertising only, it follows that smaller discount factors
suﬃce to sustain collusion in advertising and output.
It can be shown that
h
0 =
(α − c)2(n − 1)2ε2
16(1 + (n − 1)ε)2 .
Hence, h0 6 h if and only if
(n − 1) · ε2 · (2 + (n − 1)ε)2 · ((2 − ε)2φ − (n − 1)θ
2)
16(1 + (n − 1)ε)2 6 1 (13)
16For instance, if n =2 ,ε=0 .5,θ=1and φ =2 , the left hand side of inequality (13)
is equal to 175/1052 and hence the condition is obviously satisﬁed. One can replace
the condition h0 ≤ h by the weaker condition h0 <h+ g0,i fδi > 1/2 is assumed for
all i.
5 The Asymmetric Case
Next, we will analyze the case where we relax the assumption of complete symmetry.
However, a comprehensive analysis is impossible since in order to get explicit solu-
tions, we need to impose certain restrictions. We will consider a duopoly primarily
because it is easy to check the second order conditions, and also because it yields sharp






















ij − 2 · φij < 0.
In order to ensure that second order conditions are satisﬁed, assume V 2
ij <φ ij. Then,








































Given that it is practically impossible to have any meaningful analysis by considering
all types of asymmetries simultaneously, we shall focus on one asymmetry at a time.
17We shall consider an asymmetry in intercepts, namely, β1 >β 2 with symmetry with







In this case, it will always be true that advertising moves in the same direction as
quantity if, starting from a position of symmetry we introduce any asymmetry. Below
we show that depending on Vij,e i t h e rﬁrm may end up with the higher levels of both
advertising and quantity.
We shall consider asymmetry in advertising cost parameters, namely, φ12 >φ 21











and so we can rule out the possibility that q1 6 q2 and s12 > s21. But many other
possibilities are open. We shall show below that starting from symmetry if we intro-
duce an asymmetry, then quantity and advertising move in the same direction. But
either the high cost ﬁrm or the low cost ﬁrm may produce and advertise more.
Finally, we shall consider an asymmetry in advertising eﬀectiveness parameters,











and so we can rule out the possibility that q1 > q2 and s12 6 s21. But again many
other possibilities are open almost all of which may occur as we show below. In fact,
it is possible that advertising and quantity move in opposite directions if we introduce
an asymmetry in advertising eﬀectiveness starting from a position of symmetry.




which is a constant. Hence, starting from a position of
symmetry if we introduce any asymmetry, either the quantities will remain unchanged
(which is never the case as we show below) or they will move in opposite directions.
It will be never the case that they will move in the same direction.
185.1 Asymmetry in Intercepts
Let us consider an asymmetric duopoly where the ﬁrms diﬀer with regard to the initial
intercept of the demand function. Speciﬁcally, let β1 >β 2. Assume symmetry in all









We refer to ﬁrm 1 as the large ﬁrm and ﬁrm 2 as the small ﬁrm. In complete absence



























Let us now introduce the possibility of advertising. Note that











2 − 2 · φ<0
where i =1 ,2 and j 6= i. In order to ensure that the second order conditions of
maximization hold in the second stage, we assume φ>V2.N o w ,w h i c hﬁrm would
produce and advertise more depends entirely on the cost structure. We can demarcate
two ranges of costs:
Case 1: V 2 <φ<2 · V 2
In this “low cost” range, actually the smaller ﬁrm both produces and advertises





β1 + β2 − 2 · c
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19The possibility of advertising results in reversion of sizes.
Case 2: φ>2 · V 2
In this “high cost” range, the bigger ﬁrm both produces and advertises more





β1 + β2 − 2 · c
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In other words, unless advertising costs are suﬃciently high, the smaller ﬁrm would
advertise more aggressively than the bigger ﬁrm.
We illustrate using a speciﬁc example and reaction curves in Figure 1.L e t u s
start with a situation of complete symmetry. Let β1 = β2 = α =6 , c1 = c2 = c =1 ,








21 = θ =3 .L e tφ12 = φ21 = φ =6 . The reaction curve of
ﬁrm 1 is indicated by a blue line and the reaction curve of ﬁrm 2 is indicated by a red
line. Then the Cournot equilibrium is given by the intersection of the two reaction
curves at point A.E a c hﬁrm produces an equilibrium amount of 2 and advertises an
amount 0.67. Now, let us introduce a small asymmetry by assuming β1 =6 .1, β2 =6 .
Note that the parameter are consistent with the range given by Case 1. If the levels of
advertising did not change, then this would involve an rightward shift of the reaction
curve and a shift of the equilibrium point from A to B. However in response to the
above change in intercepts, advertising levels change. Firm 1 advertises an amount of
0.64 and ﬁrm 2 advertises an amount 0.71. Hence the reaction curve of ﬁrm 1 shifts
leftward (to an extent that the shift completely counteracts the original rightward
shift and hence the net shift is also leftward) and that of ﬁrm 2 shifts rightward. So,
the equilibrium moves to point C and ﬁrm 1 produces an amount 1.92 and ﬁrm 2






















N e x tc o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e nφ12 = φ21 = φ =9and other parameter values
remain unchanged. Consider a similar change in intercepts. Now the parameters are
consistent with Case 2. We illustrate this in Figure 2 and we use a similar labelling.
The points A and B are identical to analogous points in Figure 1.B u tt h ep o i n tC
is diﬀerent. Now, in the case with perfect symmetry both ﬁrms advertise an amount
0.44.O n c ew ei n t r o d u c ec h a n g ei nt h ei n t e r c e p t s ,ﬁrm 1 advertises at 0.52 and ﬁrm 2
at 0.38. Consequently, the reaction curve of ﬁrm 1 m o v e se v e nf u r t h e rr i g h t w a r da n d
that of ﬁrm 2 moves leftward. The equilibrium moves to point C and ﬁrm 1 produces






















5.2 Asymmetry in Advertising Cost Parameters
L e tu sc o n s i d e ra“ l o wc o s t ”ﬁr ma n da“ h i g hc o s t ”ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, let φ12 >φ 21.
Firm 1 is the “high cost” ﬁrm and ﬁrm 2 is the “low cost” ﬁrm. Assume symmetry





















22Now, let us introduce the possibility of advertising. We have











2 − 2 · φij < 0
where i =1 ,2 and j 6= i. In order to ensure that the second order conditions of
maximization hold in the second stage, we assume
φ12 >φ 21 >V
2.







φ12(φ21 − 2 · V 2)








φ21(φ12 − 2 · V 2)



















φ21 − 2 · V 2







φ21 − 2 · V 2
φ12 − 2 · V 2
¸
.
We will consider the following cost ranges.
Case 1: φ12 >φ 21 > 2 · V 2 >V2
Both cost parameters lie in the “high cost” range. We ﬁnd s21 >s 12. Hence
indeed we get the expected result, namely the high cost ﬁrm advertises less and the
low cost ﬁrm advertises more. Also, q1 <q 2, namely, the high cost ﬁrm produces less
than the low cost ﬁrm.
23Case 2: 2 · V 2 >φ 12 >φ 21 >V2
Both cost parameters lie in the “low cost” range. We ﬁnd s21 <s 12.N o w t h e
high cost ﬁrm advertises more and the low cost ﬁrm advertises less. Also, q1 >q 2,
namely, the high cost ﬁrm produces more than the low cost ﬁrm.
Case 3: φ12 > 2 · V 2 >φ 21 >V2
Finally, consider the case where one of the cost parameters is high and the other








2 · V 2.
This time the interior solution yields a negative result for the quantity and advertising
level of one of the ﬁrms and hence we obtain a boundary solution. One of the ﬁrms
drops out of the market and the other becomes a monopoly but still has to advertise
to keep the other ﬁrm out. Advertising takes the form of entry deterrence. The high










2 · V 2.










2 · V 2.
Again, if cost parameters are not suﬃciently high, we get seemingly counter-intuitive
results.
We illustrate the results with an example using reaction curves in Figure 3.L e tu s
start with a situation of complete symmetry. Let β1 = β2 = α =6 , c1 = c2 = c =1 ,








21 = θ =3 .L e t φ12 = φ21 = φ =6 .T h e r e a c t i o n
curve of ﬁrm 1 is indicated by a blue line and the reaction curve of ﬁrm 2 is indicated
by a red line. Then the Cournot equilibrium is given by the intersection of the two
reaction curves at point A.E a c h ﬁrm produces an equilibrium amount of 2 and
advertises an amount 0.67. Now, let us introduce a small asymmetry by assuming
φ12 =6 .1, φ21 =6 . The parameter are consistent with the range given by Case 2.
If the levels of advertising did not change, the reaction curves do not change and
the equilibrium point remains at A. However in response to the above change in
24intercepts, advertising levels change. Firm 1 advertises an amount of 0.68 and ﬁrm
2 advertises an amount 0.64. Hence the reaction curve of ﬁrm 1 shifts rightward
and that of ﬁrm 2 shifts leftward. So, the equilibrium moves to point B and ﬁrm 1


















Next consider the case when initially φ12 = φ21 =9and thereafter we increase
φ12 to 9.1. All other parameter values remain unchanged. Now the parameters are
consistent with Case 1. We illustrate this in Figure 4 and we use a similar labelling.
The points A is identical to analogous points in Figure 3.B u tt h ep o i n tB is diﬀerent.
Now, in the case with perfect symmetry both ﬁrms advertise an amount 0.44.
Once we introduce change in the intercepts, ﬁrm 1 advertises at 0.42 and ﬁrm 2 at
0.46. Consequently, the reaction curve of ﬁrm 1 moves leftward and that of ﬁrm 2
moves rightward. The equilibrium moves to point B and ﬁrm 1 produces an amount


















5.3 Asymmetry in Advertising Eﬀectiveness Parameters
Finally, let us consider the case where one ﬁrm’s advertising is exogenously more
eﬀective than the other ﬁrm. This can happen if one ﬁrm is marketing a relatively
well known brand and the other ﬁrm has very little or no brand presence, or is a new
entrant into the market. Then, comparative advertising gives the latter more brand









21. Assume symmetry in all
other dimensions, namely, for all i and j 6= i : βi = α, ci = c, φij = φ. In complete































ij − 2 · φ<0
where i =1 ,2 and j 6= i. In order to ensure that the second order conditions of
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27We will consider the following cost ranges.
Case 1: φ>2 · V 2
12 > 2 · V 2
21
The cost parameters are in the “high cost” range. Then, q1 >q 2 and s12 >s 21.
Hence, we get the expected result, namely, the ﬁrm with greater eﬀectiveness of
advertising both advertises more and produces more.
Case 2: 2 · V 2








2 · θ2 >θ 1 >θ 2.F i r s t ,q1 <q 2, hence the ﬁrm with less eﬀectiveness of advertising
produces more.
With regard to the levels of advertising, we can consider three sub-cases.
Case 2A:
2 · V 2
21 − φ






In this case, the ﬁrm (ﬁrm 2)w i t hl o w e re ﬀectiveness of advertising actually
advertises more than the other ﬁrm (ﬁrm 1).
Case 2B:
2 · V 2
21 − φ











2 · V 2
21 − φ
2 · V 2
12 − φ
< 1
In this case, ﬁrm 1 advertises more than ﬁrm 2.
Case 3: 2 · V 2
12 >φ>2 · V 2
21
In this case, the interior solution yields a negative result for the quantity and
advertising levels of one of the ﬁrms. So we obtain a boundary solution. One of the
ﬁr m sd r o po u to ft h em a r k e t .T h eo t h e rﬁrm becomes a monopoly but has to keep
advertising to keep its rival out. Advertising takes the form of entry-deterrence.





21 >φ>2 · V
2
21.








We illustrate the results in Figure 5, depicting the reaction curves of the following
example. Let us start with a situation of complete symmetry. Let β1 = β2 = α =6 ,








21 = θ =3 .L e tφ12 = φ21 = φ =6 .T h e
reaction curve of ﬁrm 1 is indicated by a blue line and the reaction curve of ﬁrm 2 is
indicated by a red line. Then the Cournot equilibrium is given by the intersection of
the two reaction curves at point A.E a c hﬁrm produces an equilibrium amount of 2









21 = θ2 =3 . The parameter are consistent with
the range given by Case 2A. If the levels of advertising did not change, the reaction
curves of ﬁrm 1 w o u l dm o v er i g h t w a r da n dt h a to fﬁrm 2 would move leftward. The
equilibrium point moves from A to B and ﬁrm 1 produces more. However in response
to the above change, advertising levels change. Firm 1 advertises an amount of 0.61
and ﬁrm 2 advertises an amount 0.75. Hence the reaction curve of ﬁrm 1 shifts
leftward and that of ﬁrm 2 shifts rightward. So, the equilibrium moves to point C
































θ =3 .L e t φ12 = φ21 = φ =9 . We illustrate the reaction curves in Figure 6.T h e
reaction curve of ﬁrm 1 is indicated by a blue line and the reaction curve of ﬁrm 2 is
indicated by a red line. Then the Cournot equilibrium is given by the intersection of
29the two reaction curves at point A.E a c hﬁrm produces an equilibrium amount of 2









21 = θ2 =3 . The parameter are consistent with the
range given by Case 1. If the advertising levels did not change, the reaction curves of
ﬁrm 1 would move rightward and that of ﬁrm 2 would move leftward. The equilibrium
point moves from A to B and ﬁrm 1 produces more. However, in response to the
above change advertising levels change. Firm 1 advertises an amount 0.63 and ﬁrm
2 advertises an amount 0.28. Consequently the reaction curve of ﬁrm 1 moves even
further rightward and that of ﬁrm 2 moves even further leftward. The equilibrium





















The asymmetric case serves to illustrate the richness of possibilities based on
parameter values as to what sort of ﬁrm would come out on top in case there are
advertising wars. Often what would happen in terms of advertising in equilibrium
may run contrary to what a casual observer may expect. Advertising may take the
30form of entry deterrence in many situations. Monopoly ﬁrms may advertise against
potential rivals who have not entered that particular market segment.5
6 Product Diﬀerentiation
In this section we explore two plausible premises about the link between the degree
of product diﬀerentiation and the eﬀectiveness of comparative advertising. One as-
sumption is that less horizontal product diﬀerentiation makes comparative advertising
more eﬀective. The other assumption is that comparative advertising is an attempt
to create or alter perception of vertical product diﬀerentiation.
6.1 Horizontal Product Diﬀerentiation and Advertising
To convey the general idea, let us assume that each ﬁrm places itself (its product)
in an abstract product space represented by a metric space. If two ﬁrms i and k are
close in the product space, then their products are close substitutes and comparative
advertising between them is highly eﬀective.
Formally, the inverse demand functions (1) are replaced by the slightly more
general form
pi = αi − qi −
X
k6=i
εik · qk (15)
Let dik denote the distance between ﬁrms i and k. Then, the assumption that less
product diﬀerentiation make products closer substitutes and comparative advertising
more eﬀective amounts to the following two conditions:





ik are strictly decreasing in dik.
Notice that dki = dik a n db ys y m m e t r yt h ee ﬀect of k’s advertising against i decreases
as well if they locate further apart. One would expect that ceteris paribus a ﬁrm will
advertise more against close than against distant competitors. Ford’s Lincoln may be
pitted primarily against General Motor’s Cadillac and not against Fiat’s Uno. This
5Of course, ﬁrms cannot advertise against nonexistent rivals, but they may advertise against
multi-product ﬁrms who are prospective rivals for the market segment in question.
31could even happen only when (a) holds while the θ
0s are independent of distance so
that the impact of horizontal product diﬀerentiation is transmitted through only one
channel. Consider, as a numerical example, the situation of three ﬁrms where ﬁrms
1 and 2 sell (almost) identical products whereas ﬁrm 3 sells a product quite diﬀerent
from the other two.
Example: There are three ﬁrms. Let us assume that there exists a number α>0
such that βi−ci = α for each ﬁrm i. We postulate that d12 =0or d12 ≈ 0 whereas d13
and d23 are very large. Let us further assume that this implies ε12 ≈ 1, ε13 ≈ 0 and
ε23 ≈ 0. For simplicity we set ε12 =1and ε23 = ε13 =0 . Hence, at the second stage
the market is divided into a segment served by ﬁrms 1 and 2 and a segment served by
ﬁrm 3. However, we allow for advertising spillovers from one segment of the market




ij =1for each pair of ﬁrms i and j. Let the advertising
cost parameters be given as φij =8f o re a c hp a i ro fﬁrms i and j.T h e n t h e y a r e
suﬃciently large to satisfy second order conditions with respect to advertising.
In the second-stage Cournot equilibrium of the duopoly formed by ﬁrms 1 and 2,




· (2α1 − α2)
2 − C
F
1 ,π 2 =
1
9




where α1 = α+s12−s21+s13−s31 and α2 = α+s21−s12+s23−s32. The second-stage









where α3 = α +s31 −s13 +s32 −s23. To determine equilibrium advertising levels, we
exploit symmetry and set s12 = s21,s 13 = s23,s 31 = s32. This reduces the ﬁrst order































Thus, indeed, advertising between the two duopolists is ﬁercer than across market
boundaries. Interestingly enough, the monopolist advertises somewhat more against
a duopolist than vice versa. The reason is that for equal advertising levels, the αi
a r ee q u a lw h e r e a st h em o n o p o l i s t ’ sp r o ﬁts and marginal beneﬁts from advertising are
clearly higher as a comparison of (16) and (17) shows.
Now, suppose in the example, the impact of horizontal product diﬀerentiation
gets transmitted through both channels, i.e. both (a) and (b) hold. We can achieve








21 = b θ>1 while keeping all other parameters ﬁxed





b θ(α + s13 − s31).
Therefore, the new equilibrium advertising levels are b s12 = b θs∗
12, b s13 = b θs∗
13, b s31 = s∗
31.
The advertising war among the duopolists has intensiﬁed as to be expected while
advertising across market boundaries has not changed.
Symmetric Case: For arbitrary ﬁxed locations, the analysis becomes very com-
plicated. In contrast, the situation becomes fully transparent in the symmetric case
with two ﬁrms to which we turn next. Let us assume n =2and make the symme-
try assumptions of the previous section. Moreover, we assume (a) and (b). Since
there are only two ﬁrms, we can drop the subscript from ε and θ. In the absence
of advertising, (3) and (4) become qi =( α − c)/(2 + ε) and πi =( qi)2, respectively.
Consequently a ﬁrm’s Cournot equilibrium proﬁts is decreasing in ε and by (a), in-
creasing with its distance from the other ﬁrm. In a two stage game, where ﬁrms ﬁrst
choose locations on the unit interval and then choose quantities, these comparative
statics yield maximum product diﬀerentiation:
Proposition 3 Suppose the product space is the unit interval. In a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the two-stage game, where ﬁrms ﬁrst choose locations and then choose
quantities, one ﬁrm locates at one end-point and the other ﬁrm locates at the opposite
end-point.
33Next we introduce advertising and consider a three stage game. In the ﬁrst stage,
ﬁrms choose locations in the product space. In the second stage, they choose adver-
tising levels. In the ﬁnal stage, they choose quantities. Notice that when locations
are ﬁxed, ε and θ are determined and the two ﬁrms face a symmetric situation as
in the previous section. Hence the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of stages
two and three are given (11) and (12). For n =2these expressions simplify to
si =( ( α − c)/(4 − ε2)) · (θ/φ) and, as before, qi =( α − c)/(2 + ε).W eh a v ea l r e a d y
seen that a ﬁrm favors maximum product diﬀerentiation, if we ignore advertising.
The comparative statics of the equilibrium advertising levels si reinforce this conclu-
sion: si is increasing in ε and θ. Hence a ﬁrm spends less on advertising if it is located
further away from the other ﬁrm. Therefore, qi increases and CF
i = φ·s2
i decreases, if
ﬁrm i moves further away from the other ﬁrm. Consequently, i’s proﬁt πi = qi
2 −CF
i
is increasing with its distance from the other ﬁrm. In the three-stage game, these
comparative statics yield again maximum product diﬀerentiation:
Proposition 4 Suppose the product space is the unit interval. In a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the three-stage game where ﬁrms choose ﬁrst locations, next advertising
levels, and ﬁnally quantities, one ﬁrm locates at one endpoint and the other ﬁrm
locates at the opposite endpoint.
In the classical Hotelling model of a linear city, ﬁrms ﬁrst choose locations on the
interval and then compete as Bertrand duopolists for consumers uniformly distributed
on the interval. If a ﬁrm moves closer to its competitor, it experiences two opposing
eﬀects on its proﬁts. The strategic eﬀect refers to the loss the ﬁrm incurs because
of ﬁercer price competition. The market share eﬀect refers to the increased demand
for the ﬁrm’s product. D’Aspremont, Gabsewicz and Thisse (1979) have shown that
the strategic eﬀect dominates the market share eﬀect so that maximum product
diﬀerentiation results in the subgame perfect equilibrium. Here we have obtained
a similar result in a very diﬀerent context: the losses from moving closer to one’s
competitor outweigh the gains. In particular, if a ﬁrm reduces its distance from
its competitor, then its advertising becomes more eﬀective. But the competitor’s
advertising becomes also more eﬀective. Consequently, the ensuing advertising war
intensiﬁes to the detriment of both ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
346.2 Advertising as Perceived Product Diﬀerentiation
In this section, we brieﬂy elaborate on the possibility that functionally equivalent
products may be perceived as diﬀerent as a consequence of persuasive advertising. If
advertising is merely aimed at brand recognition, otherwise identical products may
be perceived as horizontally diﬀerentiated. If advertising is comparative, otherwise
identical products may be perceived as vertically diﬀerentiated. This kind of virtual
product diﬀerentiation can coexist with actual product diﬀerentiation and amplify
and alleviate the eﬀects of the latter. To be more speciﬁc ,l e tu sr e c o n s i d e ram o d -
iﬁed inverse demand function of the form (15). In our previous interpretation, we
had assumed that the degree of actual horizontal product diﬀerentiation determines





ik in (7). Now let us make the opposite assumption that actual
product diﬀerentiation is non-existent or ineﬀective. By postulating (7) and (1) or
(15), we have always presumed that comparative advertising makes the own product
more desirable and the product of the ﬁrm advertised against less desirable. In that
sense, the eﬀect of comparative advertising is similar to raising the quality of one’s
own product or lowering the quality of the other product. In addition to aﬀecting
the intercepts (constant terms) αi of the inverse demand functions, advertising could
inﬂuence the substitutability of products in a more direct way, for example as follows:
εij = ε − sij · θ
i
ij + sji · θ
i
ji (18)
This formulation reﬂects the intuition that if a ﬁrm advertises against another ﬁrm,
then its own product becomes more of a substitute for the other ﬁrm’s product
whereas the other ﬁrm’s product becomes less of a substitute for one’s own product.
This speciﬁcation allows for the possibility of εij 6= εji. In other words, substitutabil-
ity is no longer a symmetric property – as should be the case with vertical product
diﬀerentiation. One can reanalyze the symmetric two stage game of section 4 under
new assumptions. In particular, let us assume n =2 ,c=0 ,φ ij = φ, and αi = βi = α









ji = θ. Then once more (12) obtains for the SPNE quantities.












Although (11) and (19) are not directly comparable because of diﬀerent roles of θ in
(7) and (18), they share several qualitative features. In particular, in both instances,
equilibrium advertising is positive and linear in the beneﬁt-cost ratio θ/φ.
6.3 Two-dimensional Product Diﬀerentiation: a Reinterpre-
tation of the Model
So far we have argued that comparative advertising creates the perception of vertical
product diﬀerentiation. It takes only a minor conceptional step to say that advertising
“is” vertical product diﬀerentiation, at least in the case of a symmetric duopoly. In
that case, our formal model can be converted into a model with vertical product
diﬀerentiation by means of the following reinterpretation: s1 = s12 is the quality
choice of ﬁrm 1 and s2 = s21 is the quality choice of ﬁrm 2. As a consequence of
Corollary 2, one obtains
Corollary 3 For α − c>θand φ suﬃciently large, in the SPNE of the two stage
game where ﬁrms make ﬁrst quality and then quantity choices, the duopolists choose
identical positive qualities, that is minimum vertical product diﬀerentiation.
By (19), a similar conclusion holds under the alternative speciﬁcation (18). Next
suppose that the spectrum of product variety (horizontal product diﬀerentiation) is
given by the unit interval and the range of product quality (vertical product diﬀeren-
tiation) is given by the nonnegative real numbers. Then the analogue of Proposition
4h o l d s .
Corollary 4 In a subgame perfect equilibrium of the three-stage game where the two
ﬁrms decide ﬁrst on variety, next on quality and ﬁnally on quantities, maximum
horizontal product diﬀerentiation and minimum vertical product diﬀerentiation (with
a positive quality level) result.
36Thus as a by-product, our analysis yields an interesting result on two-dimensional
product diﬀerentiation. Our model is a special reduced form in that individual con-
sumer choice is not explicitly speciﬁed. Fully speciﬁed models of multidimensional
product diﬀerentiation prove hard to analyze. Economides (1989) considers quality
variations in a duopoly of locationally diﬀerentiated products with linear transporta-
tion costs. In his two-stage game, variety is chosen in the ﬁrst stage and quality and
prices are chosen in the second stage. In his three-stage game, variety choice occurs
in the ﬁrst stage, quality choice in the second stage, and price choice in the last
stage. Equilibria in pure strategies need not exist. They do exist for certain parame-
ter ranges in which case the SPNE outcome for both models is maximum horizontal
product diﬀerentiation combined with minimum quality diﬀerentiation. Neven and
Thisse (1990) consider quality variations in a duopoly of locationally diﬀerentiated
products with quadratic transportation costs. Potential qualities are restricted to an
interval [q,q]. In their two-stage game, variety and quality are chosen in the ﬁrst stage
and prices are chosen in the second stage. They identify numbers Kh >K v > 0 such
that for q − q > Kv, there exists an equilibrium with maximum horizontal product
diﬀerentiation and minimum vertical product diﬀerentiation (at quality q)a n df o r
q − q 6 Kh, there exists an equilibrium with minimum horizontal product diﬀerenti-
ation (at location 1/2) and maximum vertical product diﬀerentiation. In particular,
for q −q ∈ [Kv,K h], both types of equilibria exist. As Neven and Thisse (1990) have
noted their ﬁndings as well as those of Economides and ours suggest that “ﬁrms have
a tendency to select similar strategies with respect to some characteristics, if at the
same time they are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated along the remaining dimensions.” Neven
and Thisse further assert that a similar result can be established with two vertical
characteristics. Indeed, Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) study a two-stage game
of product competition in two vertical dimensions followed by price competition and
show the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium with MaxMin diﬀerentiation,
that is maximum diﬀerentiation in one dimension and minimum diﬀerentiation in the
other dimension. However sometimes an equilibrium with maximum diﬀerentiation
in both dimensions (or with maximum diﬀerentiation in one dimension and interme-
diate diﬀerentiation in the other) may also exist. Irmen and Thisse (1998) ﬁnd that
in a location game with n > 2 characteristics, ﬁrms tend to maximize diﬀerentiation
37in the dominant characteristic and to minimize in the others when the salience coef-
ﬁcient of the former is suﬃciently large, corroborating ﬁndings by Tabuchi (1994) for
n =2and Ansari, Economides and Steckel (1998) for n =2 ,3.
7 Concluding Comments
In this paper, we perform a theoretical analysis of advertising wars where ﬁrms en-
gage in comparative advertising against each other. This practice has received a fair
amount of media attention in recent years. Any rendition of comparative advertising
episodes would be incomplete without mentioning the cola wars; see, e.g. Prince
(2000). In 1975, Pepsi launched a widely publicized taste test called the “Pepsi Chal-
l e n g e ”i nw h i c hc u s t o m e r sw e r ea s k e dt os a m p l eb o t hP e p s ia n dC o k es i d eb ys i d e
without being aware of the labels. The alleged superior performance of Pepsi in this
test was widely advertised and led to impressive increase in sales. Over the years,
both soft drink giants have launched numerous spot ads against each other.
The basic premise of our analysis is that disregarding costs, a ﬁrm’s advertising
against another ﬁrm beneﬁts the advertiser and harms the target. James and Hensel
(1991) summarize a number of studies in the marketing literature on the impact of
negative advertising on brand perception and induced brand demand based on con-
sumer surveys. Several authors ﬁnd that comparative advertising is particularly ben-
eﬁcial to new brands. Comparative advertising can also be very eﬀective if it makes
undisputed claims like ads by Visa against American Express or for Aleve against
Tylenol. Comparative advertisements invite retaliation with potentially devastating
eﬀects for both sides and likely beneﬁts to third parties. Examples are AT&T versus
MCI, Pizza Hut versus Papa John’s, Tylenol versus Advil. In our static model, we
obtain advertising wars, namely positive levels of advertising, provided that adver-
tising is not too expensive. The general version of the model allows for (positive and
negative) side-eﬀects on third parties as shown in subsection 3.1, a feature notably
absent from most of the literature.
In the perfectly symmetric version of the model, we obtain that advertising levels
are positive in equilibrium, but second-stage quantities and prices are the same as
with zero advertising. Indeed, zero advertising would be socially optimal. This result
38supports the time-honored contention – dating back to Pigou (1924) at least – that
advertising eﬀorts by competitors might just neutralize each other and prove wasteful.
Netter (1982) reports empirical evidence for the mutual cancelling of advertising
eﬀorts. Indeed, some ﬁrms “have chosen disarmament after years of ad warfare proved
fruitless – such as Unilever’s Ragu and Campbell Soup Co.’s Prego” as Neﬀ (1999)
reports. But other long-lasting feuds keep going. Take for instance, television ads for
Advil against Tylenol, for Aleve against Tylenol and for Pine-Sole against Lysol.
If in fact advertising eﬀorts by close competitors neutralize each other, then there
are potential gains from (explicit or tacit) collusive agreements to refrain from com-
parative advertising. This possibility motivated us to study the sustainability of
collusion in the dynamic version of our model. Empirically, collusion may be hard to
identify and to our knowledge has not been systematically investigated at the brand
level.6 However, the research of Alston et al. (2001) hints at potentially huge gains
f r o mc o l l u s i o na tt h em o r ea g g r e g a t el e v e l . T h e ys t a r tf r o mt h ep r e m i s et h a tp r o f -
its from generic advertising by a producer group often come partly at the expense
of producers of closely related commodities. They compare a scenario where diﬀer-
ent producer groups cooperate and choose their advertising expenditures jointly to
maximize the sum of proﬁts across groups, and a scenario where they optimize inde-
pendently. They calibrate an example using 1998 data for U.S. beef and pork and
ﬁnd that the non-cooperatively chosen expenditure on beef and pork is more than
three times the cooperative optimum.
Collusion is one possible explanation why comparative advertising is not pre-
dominant. Other reasons are regulatory restrictions and their legal repercussions.
Moreover, comparative advertising may just not be eﬀective in some markets. While
it may not be predominant, comparative advertising seems far from negligible. Ac-
c o r d i n gt oN e ﬀ (1999), among ads in the ARS database used in a 1997 study, 12 %
had direct comparisons while 16 % used indirect comparisons.
In the asymmetric case, general conclusions are hard to reach. We show using
an asymmetric duopoly in section 5 that modest parameter changes may lead to
dramatically diﬀerent outcomes.
6Though Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 596f) mention a few overt collusive attempts by cigarette
and automobile manufacturers which failed with one exception.
39In section 6, we relate product diﬀerentiation and comparative advertising. We
ﬁrst explore the assumption that less horizontal product diﬀerentiation makes com-
parative advertising more eﬀective. We illustrate the implication of this assumption
in an asymmetric example with three ﬁrms. We then consider the symmetric case
with two ﬁrms and the unit interval as the product space. In a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the three-stage game where ﬁrms ﬁrst choose locations, next adver-
tising levels, and ﬁnally quantities, one ﬁrm locates at one end-point and the other
ﬁrm locates at the opposite end-point.7 Next, we discuss the assumption that com-
parative advertising eﬀort is an attempt to create or alter consumer perception of
vertical product diﬀerentiation. Finally, we identify comparative advertising eﬀort
with quality choice and obtain a result on two-dimensional product diﬀerentiation.
Prior to us, Economides (1989) also considers two-dimensional product diﬀerentia-
tion and mentions advertising eﬀort as an example of a quality feature whose cost
is independent of output. Research eﬀort falls into this category as well. But other
quality features like use of better material, say stainless steel instead of ordinary steel
often contribute to the unit cost of output. There is also a crucial diﬀerence between
true and perceived quality attributes of consumer durables – which brings us to the
earlier debate on the eﬀects of advertising on consumer welfare. True high quality
attributes like reliability, size and speed are embodied in the product and tend to last
whereas perceived quality is subject to change, in particular if the ads creating the
perception are discontinued or countered by the competition.





qi.F i r mi chooses a positive best response if and only if
αi − ci >ε·
P
k6=i
qk.( 2 0 )
7Some of the literature on persuasive advertising, e.g., Von der Fehr and Stevik (1998), Bloch and
Manceau (1999) adopts Hotelling’s linear city model with exogenously given ﬁrm locations, because
it provides a convenient way to model individual consumer responses to advertising.
40In that case, the best response of ﬁrm i is given by the ﬁrst order condition




























(3) and (4) follow. Now replace the summation index k in (20) by j. Next replace
each qj by the corresponding right hand expression in (3). This results in the following
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(αk − ck) (21)
for all i.
The conditions (21) are satisﬁed if the terms αi − ci are identical or not too
diﬀerent across ﬁrms. When the conditions are not met, one can distinguish a set F
of ﬁrms who choose a positive output in equilibrium and the set N\F of ﬁrms who
choose a zero output in equilibrium. Then the counterparts of (3) and (21) hold for
forms i and k restricted to F.
8.2 Existence
We are going to prove the existence claim of Proposition 1 by means of a ﬁxed point
argument. We assume Vij > 0 for all i 6= j and (1) (see below) for all i ∈ N.
An SPNE has the form (s∗,q(·)). A m o n go t h e rt h i n g s ,w eh a v et oa s s o c i a t ea
Cournot equilibrium q(s)=( q1(s),...,q n(s)) to each strategy proﬁle s of the ﬁrst
stage. It is straightforward to show that given any strategy proﬁle s of the ﬁrst
stage, a Cournot equilibrium of the subsequent subgame exists. In general, Cournot
41equilibrium is not unique. But it is unique in the present setting. Namely, it follows
from the analysis of the previous subsection that equilibrium outputs are uniquely
determined, given the set M of ﬁrms that choose positive quantities in equilibrium.
It remains to be shown that M is unique. Now, take any Cournot equilibrium given
s. By keeping the equilibrium quantities of all but two ﬁrms ﬁxed and analyzing the
reduced game between the remaining two ﬁrms, say i and j,o n eﬁnds that αi −ci ≥
αj −cj, then the corresponding equilibrium outputs satisfy qi ≥ qj.L e tu sl a b e lﬁrms
so that α1 − c1 ≥ α2 − c2 ≥ ... ≥ αn − cn. Next, suppose there are two Cournot
equilibria, one where the set of ﬁrms with positive output isK = {1,...,k},a n do n e
where the set of ﬁrms with positive output is M = {1,...,m},w i t h0 ≤ k<m≤ n.
k =0means K = ∅.L e tQK and QM denote the corresponding aggregate equilibrium
outputs. Since m chooses zero output in the ﬁrst equilibrium, αm − cm ≤ ε · QK.
Using the corresponding formula for aggregate output, we obtain




Further ε(αm−cm) ≤ ε(αi−ci) for i = k+1,...,m. Adding these m−k inequalities
yields




which in turn implies
αm − cm ≤ εQM and qm =( [ αm − cm] − εQM)/(2 − ε) ≤ 0 for m’s output in the
second equilibrium, a contradiction. Hence, to the contrary, the set of ﬁrms which
choose positive output in equilibrium is unique. This completes the proof that there
is a unique Cournot equilibrium q(s) for each s.
The next step is to establish existence of a strategy proﬁle s∗ ∈ S that satisﬁes
the ﬁrst order conditions (10). In two further steps, we show that the pair (s∗,q(.))
is an SPNE and that s∗ is unique. The arguments of all three steps require that the
coeﬃcients φij,i6= j,b es u ﬃciently large. Given the assumption that (22) holds for
all i, we shall show the existence of a number ϕ>0 such that if φij >ϕfor all i 6= j,
then the conclusion of Proposition 1 holds.
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for all i. The conditions (22) are satisﬁed if the terms βi −ci are identical or not too
diﬀerent across ﬁrms. Now suppose they are satisﬁed. Then, because of (7) there
exists a number b ∈ (0,1) such that if 0 6 sij 6 b for all i 6= j, then the conditions
(21) hold. Choose b>0 with this property and and let B =[ 0 ,b]n(n−1) ⊂ S.T h e n
for s ∈ B and i ∈ N, qi(s) is given by (3) and is positive. Since each qi(s) depends
continuously on s ∈ B and B is compact, there exists K>0 such that qi(s) 6 K
for all i ∈ N and s ∈ B. Therefore there exists ϕ1 > 0 such that if φij > ϕ1 for
all i 6= j, then 0 <q i(s).Vij/φij 6 b for all s ∈ B and i 6= j. Let us choose such
a ϕ1 > 0 and suppose φij > ϕ1 for all i 6= j. Then we can deﬁne a continuous
mapping σ : B → B by setting σij(s)=qi(s)Vij/φij, for all s ∈ B and i 6= j.S i n c e
B is non-empty, compact and convex, σ has a ﬁxed point, by Brouwer’s ﬁxed point
theorem. A ﬁxed point s∗ of σ satisﬁes s∗ = σ(s∗). Hence for any i 6= j : s∗
ij = σij(s∗)
= qi(s∗)Vij/φij.T h a ti s ,s∗ satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions (10). Hence (s∗,q(.)) is
an SPNE, provided that for each ﬁrm i, πi(si,s ∗
−i) is maximized at s∗
i. We distinguish
two cases.
Case 1: sij 6 b for all j 6= i. Recall that (3) and (4) hold for any choice of
s =( si,s ∗
−i) such that sij 6 b for all j 6= i. Because of (7) and (9), there exists
ψi > 0 such that if φij >ψ i for all j 6= i,t h e nﬁrm i’s proﬁtf u n c t i o nπi(si,s ∗
−i)
has a negative deﬁnite Hessian matrix and, therefore, is a strictly concave function




φij > ϕ2 for all i 6= j. Then because of the ﬁrst order conditions (10), s∗
i is the unique
best response against s∗
−i in [0,b](n−1).
Case 2: sij >bfor some i 6= j.L e tk·k denote the Euclidean norm on Rn−1.T h e
best that can happen to ﬁrm i is that all other ﬁrms choose zero advertising and zero
output. In that case, its monopoly proﬁti s
Πi(si)=
Ã













if ﬁrm i chooses si ∈ Si in the ﬁrst stage and its proﬁt maximizing quantity given
si in the second stage. There exists ϑi > 0 such that if φij >ϑ i for all j 6= i,t h e n




Suppose φij >ϕ 3 for all i 6= j.T h e n sij >bfor some i 6= j implies ksik >band
πi(si,s ∗
−i) 6 Πi(si) < 0 <π i(s∗). Combined with Case 1 this means s∗
i is the unique
best response to s∗
−i in Si. Since this holds true for any i, (s∗,q(.)) is an SPNE indeed.
Moreover, 0 <s ∗
ij < 1 for all i 6= j as asserted.
I tr e m a i n st ob es h o w nt h a ts∗ is unique. To this end, consider the system of linear
equations given by (10), (3) and (7). It can be summarized in the form s = y + As
or (I − A)s = y where I is the n(n − 1) × n(n − 1) identity matrix and y + As is
the right-hand side of the system (10). The constant vector y and the square matrix
A are determined by the model parameters. Ceteris paribus, the entries in A can be
made arbitrarily small in absolute value by setting the advertising cost parameters
φij,i6= j suﬃciently large. Choose ϕ4 > ϕ3 so that this holds true if φij > ϕ4 for all
i 6= j. Suppose that in fact φij > ϕ4 for all i 6= j.I nt h a tc a s e ,t h em a t r i xI − A has
a dominant diagonal and consequently is non-singular [by Theorem 1 of McKenzie
(1960)]. Therefore, the system (I − A)s = y has a unique solution s∗. Hence, there
exists only one SPNE where all ﬁrms choose positive quantities and advertising levels.
Under the hypothesis that (22) holds for all i,w eh a v es h o w ne x i s t e n c eo fan u m b e r
ϕ4 > 0 such that if φij >ϕ 4 for all i 6= j, then the conclusion of Proposition 1 holds.
This completes the proof.
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